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What	makes	Urban	Governance	Co-productive?	Contradictions	in	the	Current	
Debate	on	Co-production.		
Abstract	
Following	 a	 number	 of	 prominent	 concepts	 in	 urban	 planning,	 like	 participatory	planning	 or	 self-	 help	 housing,	 co-production	 has	 started	 to	 gain	 momentum	 in	 the	global	South	context.	While	it	is	has	been	long	discussed	as	a	means	of	service	provision,	the	 term	 is	more	and	more	often	used	 in	 the	broader	 sense	of	urban	governance	and	policy	planning.	This	understanding	goes	beyond	the	aspect	of	scaling-up	successful	co-productive	 infrastructure	 focused	 projects;	 rather,	 it	 indicates	 a	 different	 format	 of	engagement	for	prompting	urban	stakeholders	into	planning	citywide	urban	solutions.	This	article	discusses	the	distinction	between	the	different	levels	of	co-	production	and	their	 inter-linkages,	and	it	 investigates	the	relevance	of	positioning	co-production	as	a	factor	 framing	 urban	 governance.	 This	 includes	 a	 discussion	 on	 three	 main	contradictions	 that	 can	 be	 identified	within	 the	 current	 discussion	 on	 co-production.	Finally,	 it	 identifies	 a	 set	 of	 arguments	 for	 elaborating	 the	 role	 of	 co-production	 in	 a	policy	and	urban	governance	setting.		
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Introduction	
The	 flow	 of	 urban	 discourses,	 originating	 in	 the	 power	 centres,	 has	 for	 decades	impacted	 planning	 practices	 in	 the	 global	 South.	 Probably	 one	 of	 the	most	 influential	shifts	 in	 the	way	planning	was	done	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 in	 the	South	 came	with	Turner’s	 notion	 of	 self-help	 housing,	 which	 celebrated	 the	 role	 of	 the	 urban	 poor	 as	autonomous	 stakeholders	 with	 the	 capacity	 to	 steer	 the	 development	 of	 urban	settlements	 (Turner	 and	 Fitcher,	 1972;	 Turner,	 1977).	 This	 salient	 framework	supported	 the	 establishment	 of	 approaches	 that	 resulted	 in	 greater	 involvement	 of	communities	 in	 the	 planning,	 construction	 and	 evaluation	 of	 urban	 development	
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projects.	Over	the	following	decades,	major	international	agencies	promoted	a	series	of	landmark	 approaches,	 including	 state-aided	 self-help	 housing,	 participatory	 slum	upgrading	 or	 community	 driven	 development.	 At	 a	 project	 level,	 the	 effects	 of	 this	participatory	 turn	 in	 planning	 in	 the	 South	 were	 considered	 to	 have	 generally	 been	beneficial	and	to	have	helped	to	empower	particular	groups.	Nevertheless,	in	retrospect	it	 is	 doubtful	 whether	 this	 impulse	 resulted	 in	 real	 and	 meaningful	 advances,	 in	particular	 in	 terms	 of	 power-relations	 –	 a	 factor	 identified	 as	 an	 important	motor	 of	urban	spatial	change	(Watson,	2009).	The	classic	model	in	which	external	stakeholders	consult	the	local	population	has	proven	to	be	susceptible	to	misuse	by	a	wide	array	of	urban	 actors,	 starting	 with	 public	 administrations	 and	 ending	 with	 the	 community	members	themselves	(Cooke	and	Khotari,	2001).	Rather	than	bettering	the	position	of	the	urban	poor,	 the	de-politicization	of	 the	housing	question	 (Burgess,	1978)	and	 the	creation	of	sanctioned	spaces	of	participation	have	been	often	used	to	extend	the	state’s	control	over	society	(Miraftab,	2009).	Consequently,	in	spite	of	the	participatory	turn	in	planning,	 true	 citizen	 participation	 in	 the	 core	 functions	 of	 government	 remains	extremely	rare	(Ackerman,	2004).	Moreover,	 regardless	 of	 the	 solutions	 applied	 by	 formal	 agencies,	 the	 huge	population	 segment	 of	 unprivileged	 urban	 dwellers	 continues	 to	 grow	 and	 their	informal	and	precarious	settlements	still	constitute	a	dominant	feature	of	many	cities	in	the	 South.	 As	 a	 result,	 this	 sustained	 prevalence	 has	 more	 recently	 led	 to	 a	 re-formulation	of	the	focal	question,	namely	is	it	the	urban	poor	who	need	to	participate	in	formal	 planning	 processes,	 or	 is	 it	 not	 the	 planning	 systems	 themselves	 that	 need	 to	understand	 and	 take	 account	 of	 the	 dominant	 characteristics	 of	 Southern	 cities?	Consequently,	 many	 scholars	 have	 come	 to	 recognise	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 analysing	squatting	 and	 informality	 using	 investigative	 models	 developed	 by	 conventional	planning	agencies,	which	have	proven	to	be	contextually	divorced	from	urban	realities,	and	 instead	 now	 emphasise	 the	 need	 to	 analyse	 how	 squatting	 practices	 constitute	cities	per	se	(Pieterse,	2008;	Vasudevan,	2015).	One	 of	 the	 prominent	 concepts	 currently	 discussed	 within	 planning	 theory	 to	address	 these	 challenges,	 and	 that	 is	 seen	 as	 ‘structuring	 planning	 and	 urban	development	processes	 in	certain	global	South	contexts’	(Watson,	2014:	63),	 is	that	of	co-production.	It	is	considered	to	be	inclusive	of	developmental	logic	and	a	knowledge	
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of	 these	 urban	 actors,	 which	 do	 not	 typically	 fit	 into	 state-led	 and	 ‘professional’	planning	 schemes,	 and	as	 such	 represents	 the	dominant	nature	of	 the	urban	 realm	 in	the	South	(Watson,	2009).		However,	 similar	 to	 other	 popular	 buzzwords	 like	 ‘self-help’	 in	 the	 1970s	 or	‘community	development’	in	the	1980s	(Sihlongonyane,	2009),	the	concept	can	acquire	different	 meanings	 that	 are	 not	 necessarily	 mutually	 compatible.	 The	 term	 co-production	 is	 used	 interchangeably	 with	 other	 concepts,	 for	 instance	 co-creation	(Voorberg,	et	al.,	2015),	and	some	of	its	definitions	‘are	vague	and	unhelpful’	(Joshi	and	Moore,	2004:	39).	Furthermore,	along	with	the	classic	distinction	of	co-production	as	a	service-delivery	 strategy	 (Albrechts,	 2012),	 the	 concept	 is	 more	 and	 more	 often	discussed	as	a	 form	of	engagement	by	different	 stakeholders	at	a	policy	and	planning	level,	 in	 particular	 as	 embedded	 via	 various	 bodies	 established	 within	 the	 sphere	 of	formal	governance.	 	 Similarly,	 co-production	and	co-design	are	 increasingly	 identified	as	a	distinct	approach	to	knowledge	building	and	research	(Moser,	2016).	In	 2017	 alone	 the	 term	 of	 co-production	was	 discussed	 in	 variety	 of	 different	contexts,	 demonstrating	 both	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 concept	 as	 well	 as	 its	 growing	ambiguity.	This	is	illustrated	by	a	number	of	conferences	and	panels,i	the	start	of	a	PhD	programmeii	and	planning	of	 a	 special	 issue	by	 a	major	 journal,iii	all	 revolving	 around	the	theme	of	co-production.	Based	 on	 a	 review	 of	 the	 literature	 to	 date	 and	 the	 author’s	 own	 research	experiences,	 this	 article	 deals	 with	 a	 specific	 grey	 area	 in	 which	 co-production	 is	increasingly	 discussed	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 urban	 governance	 and	 policy	 framing.	 It	examines	 how	 the	 concept	 of	 co-production	 overlaps	 with	 that	 of	 participatory	planning,	thus	debating	the	relevance	of	positioning	it	within	institutionalised	forms	of	urban	 governance	 in	 the	 global	 South.	 In	 essence,	 the	 article	 argues	 that	 the	 concept	requires	 sharper	 theoretical	 frames	 if	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 reflective	 of	 the	 basic	strategies	of	the	urban	poor,	to	represent	the	view	from	the	South,	or	to	be	influential	in	the	sphere	of	planning	(Bovaird,	2007;	Watson,	2014).	The	ultimate	aim	is	to	assist	 in	distinguishing	 between	 governance-oriented	 formats	 that	 enable	 the	 development	 of	new	urban	solutions	and	those	that	do	not.	On	the	one	hand,	this	is	motivated	by	a	belief	in	 the	 need	 to	 delink	 the	 debate	 from	 the	 notion	 of	 participatory	 urban	 governance,	rooted	in	development	discourses	and	practices	in	‘Northern’	cities	and	mainstreamed	through	 global	 development	 agencies	 such	 as	 the	 UN	 or	 the	 Cities	 Alliance	 (Pieterse,	
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2008).	 As	 such,	 the	 article	 is	 intended	 as	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 formulation	 of	 new	theoretical	perspectives	on	the	major	urban	processes	occurring	in	the	South,	but	which	have	to	date	largely	been	perceived	as	‘alternative’	or	‘innovative’	vis-à-vis	approaches	originating	 from	 the	 power	 centres.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 goal	 is	 to	 further	 the	distinction	between	 those	 formats	 that	 truly	 represent	 approaches	by	 informal	urban	actors	from	those	that	subject	them	to	an	external	developmental	logic.				The	discussion	below	takes	 its	cue	 from	the	conceptualisation	of	co-production	as	a	deliberate	engagement	between	the	grassroots	and	the	state,	and	characterised	by	a	 dynamic	 that	 encourages	 it	 to	 move	 beyond	 a	 local	 orientation	 towards	 more	sustainable	 change	 (Mitlin,	 2008:	 353).	 It	 looks	 at	 both	 a	 range	 of	 new	 institutional	possibilities	that	can	affect	urban	governance	in	real	terms	(Watson,	2014,	74)	and	–	as	has	already	been	widely	described	in	the	case	of	the	Asian	Coalition	of	Housing	Rights	(ACHR)	 –	 the	 specific	 movements	 able	 to	 capitalise	 on	 their	 own	 knowledge	 and	 a	finance	base	in	order	to	develop	formats	of	engagement	with	urban	politics.	As	such,	the	discussion	links	back	to	the	argument	that	cities	in	the	South	are	predominantly	built	by	the	urban	dwellers	themselves,	and	that	a	proper	recognition	of	this	sphere	of	activities	at	 a	 governance	 level	 can	 result	 in	 the	 production	 of	 better	 urban	 solutions.	 The	argument	is	based	on	a	review	of	three	main	visible	contradictions	in	the	discussion	on	co-production:	 institutionalisation	 versus	 flexibility,	 conflict	 versus	 cooperation,	 and	process	versus	outputs.	
Co-production	in	policy	settings	and	the	participatory	governance	spectrum	
The	 co-production	 debate	 commenced	 in	 1970,	 and	 although	 initially	 a	 marginal	concept	 it	 gradually	 became	 prominent	 in	 public	management	 and	 economic	 studies.	One	of	the	research	pioneers	in	the	field,	Elinor	Ostrom	(1996:	1073),	defined	it	as	‘the	process	 through	which	 inputs	 used	 to	 produce	 a	 good	 or	 service	 are	 contributed	 by	individuals	who	are	not	“in”	the	same	organisation.’	Almost	from	the	point	 it	was	first	analysed,	co-production	was	identified	as	extending	the	meaning	of	classic	participatory	models	 and	 as	 a	 case	 of	 citizens	 exercising	 a	 potential	 effect	 on	 policy	 formulation	(Whitaker,	1980).	Typically	 though,	 these	earlier	conceptualisations	concerned	micro-level	 co-productive	 interventions	 (Brandsen	 and	 Pestoff,	 2006),	 with	 numerous	 case	
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studies	illustrating	how	small-scale	projects	impacted	on	particular	power	relations	in	specific	contexts.	Usually	this	was	not	identified	as	a	critical	movement	towards	larger	changes	 in	 urban-governance	 structures,	 although	 further	 studies	 did	 link	 co-production	 to	different	 types	of	activities,	 including	 the	 involvement	of	 citizens	 in	 the	co-planning,	co-design,	co-prioritising,	co-management,	co-financing	and	co-assessment	of	 interventions	 (Bovaird	 and	 Löffer,	 2013).	 This	 focus	 on	 the	 planning	 and	 design	aspect	of	co-production	 is	reflected	 in	 the	 literature,	Voorberg,	Bekkers	and	Tummers	(2015)	having	established	that	of	107	articles	and	books	published	between	1987	and	2013	in	public	management	literature,	30	of	them	identified	citizens	as	the	co-designers	of	initiatives	and	10	as	their	initiators.	A	 number	 of	 these	 conceptualisations,	 largely	 based	 on	 case	 studies	 from	 the	North,	 differentiate	 between	 various	 state/citizen	 cooperative	 formats,iv	including	 co-production,	 co-management	 and	 co-governance.	 The	 latter	 is	 defined	 as	 an	‘arrangement	 in	 which	 the	 third	 sector	 participates	 in	 the	 planning	 and	 delivery	 of	public	 services’	 (Bransend	 and	 Pestoff,	 2006:	 497).	 In	 this	 sense,	 co-governance	 is	distinguished	 from	co-production	and	co-management	 to	 the	extent	 that	 it	 focuses	on	policy	formulation	as	opposed	to	implementation.	A	similar	distinction	is	proposed	by	Ackerman	 (2004),	 for	 whom	 ‘co-governance	 for	 accountability'	 assumes	 a	 direct	participation	 of	 societal	 actors	 in	 the	 core	 functions	 of	 government.	 A	 separation	between	 the	 different	 actors	 assuming	 specific	 roles	 in	 the	 delivery	 and	 planning	 of	urban	 interventions	 is	 also	 present	 in	 Bovaird’s	 categorisation	 (2007),	 whereby	 he	makes	a	distinction	between	the	various	types	of	professional/user	relationships	in	the	separate	 stages	 of	 a	 project.	 The	 community	 may,	 for	 instance,	 be	 only	 involved	 in	service	 delivery,	 in	 co-planning,	 or	 indeed	 in	 both,	 but	 importantly,	 co-productive	categorisation	also	includes	arrangements	through	which	communities	deal	exclusively	with	 policy	 planning	 and	 have	 no	 role	 in	 actual	 service	 delivery.	 As	 such,	 there	 is	 no	explicit	 continuity	 between	 project-level	 activities	 and	 broader	 policy-planning	activities.	 Consequently,	 co-production	 is	 not	 identified	 as	 mezzo-level	 political	engagement	and	a	broader	struggle	for	choice	(Mitlin,	208:	347),	although	it	is	seen	as	a	potential	strategy	for	the	negotiation	of	norms	and	regulations	(Boviard,	2007).	Overall,	 although	 these	 conceptualisations	 vary	 on	 a	 case-to-case	 basis,	 their	shared	premise	is	that	citizens	can	have	a	significant	impact	on	policy	making.	They	also	
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have	 common	 denominators,	 including	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 institutionalisation	 and	consensual	 character	 of	 participatory	 space	 is	 key	 to	 its	 success.	 With	 these	characteristics,	 the	 scheme	 resembles	 the	 communicative	 or	 collaborative	 processes	that	 are	 an	 important	 idea	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	 planning	 frameworks	 in	 the	 North,	although	 they	 nevertheless	 may	 not	 be	 entirely	 reflective	 of	 the	 transformations	 in	urban	 contexts	 in	 the	 South	 (Watson,	 2009).	 Further,	 the	 understanding	 of	 co-production	 or	 co-governance	 as	 a	 participatory	 scheme	 that	 places	 the	 state	 or	 the	public	sector	as	its	main	facilitator	poses	similar	risks.	Rather	than	providing	remedies	for	 local	 problems,	 endeavours	 positioned	 as	 state-initiated	 participatory	 urban-governance	processes	may	become	a	vehicle	 for	the	 institutionalisation	of	 inequalities	(Lemansky,	 2017)	 and	 ‘may	 appear	 as	 innovations,	 but	 are	 often	 fashioned	 out	 of	existing	 forms	 through	 a	 process	 of	 institutional	 bricolage,	 using	whatever	 is	 at	 hand	and	 re-inscribing	 existing	 relationships,	 hierarchies	 and	 rules	 of	 the	 game’	 (Cornwall,	2004:	 2).	 These	 issues	 are,	 for	 instance,	 common	 in	 stakeholder	 forums	 –	 a	 growing	form	of	agency	designed	to	deal	with	strategic	planning	issues.	While	formally	inclusive,	involving	 urban	 stakeholders	 from	 across	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors	 and	 civil	society,	 they	 also	 entail	 the	 risk	 of	 depoliticising	 the	 agendas	 of	 urban	 movements,	instead	catering	for	well-resourced	groups	in	urban	governance.	Therefore,	rather	than	being	 inscribed	 in	 their	 set-up,	 the	 progressive	 potential	 of	 such	 forums	 is	 best	extraneously	 anchored	via	 the	 activism	and	 autonomy	of	 the	 civil	 society	movements	involved	 (Pieterse,	 2008:	 94).	 When	 linked	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 co-production,	 this	translates	 to	movements	 that	 are	well-networked	 and	 actively	 involved	 in	 large-scale	bottom-up	work,	rather	than	in	minor	on-the-ground	programmes	and	participation	in	deliberative	spaces	set	up	by	the	public	sector.	While	either	group	may	be	characterised	as	 progressive,	 their	 ability	 to	 deliver	 their	 aims	 within	 the	 spectrum	 of	 formal	governance	is	undoubtedly	linked	to	the	degree	of	mobilisation	they	command	and	the	power	they	represent.	In	line	with	this	perspective,	co-governance,	as	described	in	the	previous	 paragraph,	 may	 not	 differ	 significantly	 from	 a	 number	 of	 public-sector-led	participatory	 governance	 schemes,	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 not	 strongly	 rooted	 in	 an	 urban	movement.			 	What	 is	 here	 subsequently	 discussed	 is	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 different	levels	 of	 co-production	 and	 their	 inter-linkages,	 investigating	 the	 relevance	 of	positioning	co-production	as	a	factor	in	framing	urban	governance.	The	ambiguity	in	the	
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understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 is	 captured	 through	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 three	 main	paradoxes	resonating	in	the	current	discussion	on	co-production.		
Contradiction	one:	institutionalisation	vs.	flexibility	
Joshi	 and	Moore	 (2004:	40)	define	 institutionalised	 co-production	 as	 the	provision	of	public	 services	 ‘through	 regular,	 long-term	 relationships	 between	 state	 agencies	 and	organised	groups	of	citizens,	where	both	make	substantial	resource	contributions’,	with	the	 two	 main	 types	 of	 co-production	 identified	 as	 being	 logisticalv	and	 governance	driven.	 The	 latter	 includes	 situations	 in	 which	 organised	 groups	 of	 citizens	 become	involved	in	governance	in	response	to	an	institutional	capacity	deficit	at	either	a	local	or	national	public	level.	In	this	sense,	the	institutionalisation	of	participation	is	viewed	as	one	of	 the	best	steps	to	assure	the	sustainability	of	participatory	schemes	(Ackerman,	2004).	 In	 the	 context	of	 settlement	development,	 this	has	been	 shown	 to	be	 true	at	 a	project	 level	 in	 cases	 where	 a	 variety	 of	 incremental	 solutions	 were	 supported	 by	government	 measures,	 either	 through	 subsidies	 or	 technical	 assistance,	 and	 then	successfully	 implemented	 (Greene	 and	 Rojas,	 2008).	 Moreover,	 the	 examples	 of	 co-governance	discussed	by	Ackerman	suggest	that	the	‘absence	of	a	clear	legal	framework	left	 participation	 up	 to	 the	 whims	 of	 individual	 bureaucrats,	 leading	 to	 the	 eventual	overturning	of	participatory	schemes	once	 there	was	a	change	of	heart	on	 the	part	of	the	 government’	 (2004:	 459).	 Similarly,	 a	 lack	 of	 full	 engagement	 by	 the	 government	bears	the	risk	of	reinforcing	intra-community	power	relations	and	clientelistic	networks	(ibid.).	This	concurs	with	the	opinion	that	in	risk-adverse	administrative	cultures,	public	officials	 require	 organisational	 tools	 for	 active	 citizen	 involvement.	 According	 to	 this	line	of	thought,	if	a	sustainable	relationship	between	the	organisations	representing	the	public	sector	and	citizens	is	absent,	this	relationship	needs	to	be	structured	in	order	to	build	a	long-lasting	platform	of	cooperation	(Voorberg,	et	al.,	2015).	In	their	analysis	of	public-management	publications,	Voorberg,	Bekkers	and	Tummers	(2015)	identify	the	fact	that	actions	facilitating	a	relationship	can	originate	from	both	sides	of	the	equation	-– either	an	organisation	initiated	by	the	public	sector,	or	for	that	matter	by	the	citizens.However,	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 authors,	 all	 such	 initiatives	 are	 referred	 to	 in	 thepublications	they	reviewed	as	something	that	 the	public	sector	(organisations)	should
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undertake	 (Voorberg,	 Bekkers	 and	 Tummers,	 2015).	 Seen	 from	 this	 perspective,	 the	majority	 of	 co-productive	 projects	 fit	 the	 definition	 of	 invited	 spaces	 of	 participation	rather	than	invented	ones	(Cornwall,	2004).		In	 its	 ideal	 sense,	 the	 goal	 of	 co-production	 is	 to	 strengthen	 the	 position	 of	citizens,	 and	 their	 institutionalisation	 via	 formal	 governance	 structures	 may	 indeed	reflect	the	achievement	of	this	goal.	However,	it	is	by	no	means	simple	to	transfer	this	fairly	 obvious	 assumption	 about	 co-production	 to	 conditions	 and	 processes	 in	 the	South.	Firstly,	 the	strength	of	 co-production	 in	 the	South	 is	 that	 it	operates	outside	of	existing	norms	and	regulations	(Mitlin,	2008;	Watson,	2014).	In	the	reality	of	informal	and	precarious	settlements,	 imposed	building	codes	or	 institutional	arrangements	are	simply	counter-productive.	Indeed,	here	the	urge	to	sustain	everyday	living	needs	or	to	improve	personal	habitat	 involves	not	adhering	 to	but	creatively	overcoming	external	regulations.	 If	 systematised	 through	collective	action,	 these	approaches	have	a	chance	to	 become	 a	 form	 of	 development	 practice,	 counterbalancing	 official	 development	paradigms.	As	underscored	by	Pieterse	(2008:	99),	‘state	bureaucracies	tend	to	be	rigid,	hierarchical	 and	 conformist	 institutions’	 –	 in	 other	 words	 are	 unlikely	 to	 adopt	innovative	 solutions	 unless	 confronted	 by	 external	 pressures	 resulting	 in	 new	alternatives.	Whilst	 these	 situations	 are	 reported	 to	be	 very	 rare,	 co-production	 in	 its	true	sense	remains	a	channel	that	can	best	leverage	the	aspirations	of	the	urban	poor.	When	 it	 does	 occur,	 however,	 it	 is	 typically	 achieved	 outside	 of	 fixed	 regulatory	situations	in	long-term	relationships	between	local	government	and	local	communities,	entailing	 continuous	 programme	 support,	 the	 funding	 of	 experimental	 activities	 and	responding	flexibly	to	emerging	opportunities	(Mitlin	and	Satterthwaite,	2004:	295).	In	essence,	project-level	 innovations	happen	 in	 spite	of	 regulations	not	because	of	 them,	and	co-production	 is	 realised	because	 ‘formal	channels	of	engagement	do	not	exist	or	are	not	satisfactory’	(Watson,	2014:	71).	Secondly,	the	fact	that	the	urban	poor	in	the	South	operate	in	an	informal	sphere	also	defines	 their	realm	of	expertise,	 thus	constituting	their	resources.	While	a	 lack	of	institutionalisation	 exposes	 them	 to	 political	 vulnerabilities,	 becoming	meshed	 in	 the	domain	of	rules	and	regulations	equally	potentially	poses	the	risk	of	submission	to	an	alien	 language	 of	 conventional	 planning	 procedures	 and	 institutions.	 The	 danger,	therefore,	is	two-fold.	On	the	one	hand,	engaging	with	authority	can	entail	cooperation	
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with	more	powerful	actors	who	merely	‘purport	to	be	concerned	with	poverty	and	with	citizenship’	 (Appadurai,	2001:	42).	These	counterparts	may	try	 to	 instrumentalize	 the	urban	poor	through	the	formation	of	a	dependency	based	on	a	lack	of	preparedness	to	navigate	 the	rigid	environment	of	hierarchical	public	bureaucracy.	On	 the	other	hand,	this	 also	 relates	 to	 the	 positioning	 and	 identity	 of	 the	 urban	 poor	 as	 actors	 in	 a	development	 process	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 participation	 in	 governance	 impacts	 on	 the	participants’	sense	of	themselves	(Healey,	2003).	In	 these	 types	 of	 contexts,	 for	 some	 groups	 the	 threats	 embodied	 in	institutionalisation	may	outweigh	 the	beneficial	 protective	 factor.	 Since	 the	processes	‘that	 underpin	 “real”	 governance	 often	 reflect	 informal	 bargaining	 power	much	more	than	formal	institutionalised	frameworks’	(Siame,	2016:	6),	it	is	precisely	in	this	sphere	that	 the	 urban	 poor	 need	 to	 exercise	 their	 power	 and	 safeguard	 their	 independence.	Consequently,	 for	 many	 civil	 society	 groups	 the	 ideal	 starting	 point	 is	 to	 engage	 in	governance	 through	 informal	 channels	 rather	 than	 via	 an	 external	 actor	 who	 ‘gives’	them	access	to	governance.	Vice	versa,	when	initiated	by	the	public	sector	the	process	of	formalisation	brings	with	it	a	high	risk	of	regulatory	frameworks	being	imposed,	which	in	 turn	 undermines	 community-based	 approaches.	 Although	 involving	 the	 citizens	 in	participatory	schemes	at	the	earliest	possible	stage	(Ackerman,	2004)	can	be	one	way	of	facilitating	engagement	by	 the	public	 sector,	 responding	 to	pre-existing	arrangements	outside	formal	planning	processes,	or	indeed	deliberately	leaving	a	scope	open	for	the	development	of	such,	may	be	more	interesting	solutions.	Thirdly,	much	of	the	success	of	project-level	activities	by	the	urban	poor	 lies	 in	collective	organisation	rather	than	individual	endeavours	(Banana,	et	al.,	2015).	In	the	Southern	context	there	are	convincing	reasons	to	believe	that	the	key	to	the	creation	of	a	 significant	 role	 of	 the	 poor	 in	 urban	 governance	 is	 the	 formation	 of	 some	 sort	 of	collective	power.	There	is,	however,	a	caveat	to	this.	Thus	while	classic	representative	democracy	 has	 been	 found	 to	 be	 ineffective	 in	 this	 respect,	 for	 instance	 in	 failing	 to	facilitate	popular	political	 involvement	or	guarantee	 redistributive	mechanisms	 (Fung	and	Wright,	2003:	3),	some	of	the	more	elaborate	participatory	schemes	can	also	suffer	from	 similar	 drawbacks,	 resulting	 in	 a	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 civil	 society	 agenda.	 This	risk	 is	 visible	 even	 in	 the	 widely	 praised	 case	 of	 participatory	 budgeting	 in	 Puerto	Allegre	in	Brazil.	In	its	initial	stages,	politicians	tried	to	impose	an	individualised	voting	mechanism,	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	 arrangement	 where	 neighbourhood	 associations	 had	
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decision-making	power	–	a	proposal	 that	was	actively	opposed	by	civil	 society	actors.	(Mitlin,	 2008:	 355).	 Currently,	 as	 replicated	 in	 other	 countries,	 this	 participatory	budgeting	‘best	practice’	lacks	its	crucial	component,	namely	it	suffers	from	the	lack	of	large	 deliberative	 spaces	 for	 local	 committees	 to	 debate	 before	 the	 voting	 process	begins	 (Sześciło,	 2015).	 Therefore,	 the	 transplanting	 of	 an	 ‘innovation’	 such	 as	participatory	budgeting	to	situations	characterised	by	weak	civil	society	structures	can	potentially	act	as	an	enticement	for	the	public	sector	to	choose	less	‘messy’	frameworks	that	lack	spaces	of	deliberation.	For	example,	one	argument	is	that	co-production	can	be	facilitated	by	 lowering	 the	 threshold	 for	 citizen	participation,	 for	 instance	by	 offering	plebiscitary	 choices	 rather	 than	providing	 opportunities	 to	 debate	 complicated	policy	issues	(Voorberg,	et	al.,	2015).	As	much	as	this	can	be	helpful	in	the	context	of	project-level	 interventions	and	 from	the	perspective	of	public	sector	 implementers,	 its	effects	are	not	ultimately		beneficial	to	the	urban-poor	counterparties	involved	in	the	process.	Instead,	 on	 the	 whole	 such	 mechanisms	 may	 in	 fact	 undermine	 the	 building	 of	 a	collective	group	agenda,	in	turn	weakening	their	relative	negotiating	position.	A	further	key	 factor	 is	 that	 these	 practices	 do	 not	 translate	 into	 changes	 in	 governance	 if	 the	whole	process	involved	is	one	of	deciding	about	pre-defined	solutions.		What	 these	examples	generally	 show	 is	 that	even	when	postulated	as	a	proper	solution	to	the	problems	of	the	poor,	positioning	institutionalised	co-production	in	the	global	South	remains	difficult	and	fraught	with	ambiguities.	Whereas	the	instrument	of	institutionalised	 co-production	 undoubtedly	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 increase	 service	delivery	at	a	project	level,	nevertheless	the	framework	may	also	be	counter-productive	if	 co-production	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 continuum	of	 actions	 by	 the	 urban	poor	with	 the	objective	of	affecting	urban	governance	and	policies.	Having	said	this,	there	is	arguably	a	necessity	 to	safeguard	 the	role	of	 the	urban	poor	 in	urban	governance	and	decision	making	 through	 institutionalisation	 in	 situations	 of	 a	 weak	 and	 unorganised	 civil	society.vi	Because	many	regulatory	frameworks	are	opportunistically	exploited	by	those	who	 hold	 political	 or	 economic	 power,	 rather	 than	 simply	 following	 the	 prescribed	routes	 of	 contributing	 to	 the	 execution	 of	 existing	 policies,	 stronger,	well-established	movements	may	opt	for	flexible	arrangements	with	governments	so	as	to	allow	them	to	shape	actual	policies	and	laws	(Watson,	2009).	
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Consequently,	 the	 term	 co-production	 of	 governance	may	 better	 reflect	 urban	transition	in	the	South	than	the	concept	of	co-governance	discussed	above.	Since	direct	societal	 participation	 in	 governmental	 functions	 is	 extremely	 rare,	 fragile	 ‘co-governance’	arrangements	should	not	be	treated	as	a	given	fact	but	as	a	process	that	is	steered	via	social-movement-initiated	co-production	(Mitlin,	2008)	and	safeguarded	by	active	movements	 operating	 outside	 of	 the	 formal	 governmental	 sphere.	 Rather	 than	only	being	a	form	of	institutionalised	deliberation,	the	co-production	of	governance	can	be	defined	as	an	open-ended	process	that	enables	the	urban	poor	to	continuously	affect,	review	 and	 update	 policies	 within	 or	 outside	 of	 formally	 recognised	 bodies.	 Ideally,	their	 impact	 should	mirror	 their	 own	protocols	 and	 safeguard	principles	 of	 flexibility	and	collective	action.		
Contradiction	two:	cooperation	vs.	conflict	
The	 issue	of	 institutionalisation	 closely	 relates	 to	 the	 role	 of	 conflict	 in	 co-productive	planning	arrangements.	Overall,	co-production	requires	cooperation	between	different	groups	 of	 stakeholders	 and	 assumes	 long-term	 relationships,	 substantial	 resource	contributions,	as	well	as	a	sharing	in	the	range	of	decision-making	power.	A	variety	of	case	 studies	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature	 underscore	 the	 equality	 between	 civil	 society	and	public	 sector,	 although	 it	 is	 often	 considered	 to	 result	 from	 the	 ‘good	will’	 of	 the	latter	(Voorberg,	et	al.,	2015:	1344)	and	not	as	something	that	is	achieved	by	the	actions	of	the	former.	As	such,	equality	is	confined	only	to	the	deliberative	space	and	as	a	factor	safeguarded	 by	 more	 powerful	 actors,	 which	 in	 itself	 positions	 them	 in	 a	 more	privileged	 negotiation	 position.	 The	 principle	 of	 excluding	 local	 power	 holders	 from	specific	governance	arrangements,	as	described	by	Joshi	and	Moore	(2004)	in	the	case	of	 the	 Citizen	 Police	 Liaison	 Committee	 in	 Karachi,	may	 be	 a	more	 promising	way	 to	ensure	equality	within	decision-making.	However,	unless	self-regulated	by	civil	society,	it	simultaneously	places	the	public	sector	in	a	privileged	position.	This	similarly	applies	to	the	principle	of	 the	consensual	character	of	 the	arrangement,	which	can	potentially	fail	 to	reflect	urban	transition	 in	the	South.	This	 includes	the	example	of	participatory	budgeting	 in	 Puerto	 Allegre,	which	 thanks	 to	 its	 set-up	 included	 an	 in-built	 pro-poor	bias	as	a	form	of	counterbalancing	powerful	interests	(Ackerman,	2004).	Nevertheless,	
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the	 participatory	 budgeting	 in	 this	 case	 was	 shaped	 with	 significant	 input	 from	 civil	society	and	faced	resistance	 from	power	holders.	Rather	than	being	an	exception,	 this	type	 of	 situation	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 the	 norm,	 representing	 the	 approach	 of	development	 agencies	 and	 governments	who	 do	 not	want	 the	 urban	 poor	 to	 attain	 a	status	equal	to	theirs	(Papeleras,	et	al.,	2012).	This	in	turns	links	to	Watson’s	argument	concerning	 the	 difficulty	 of	 sustaining	 consensus-based	 planning-process	 practices,	which	involves	different	sets	of	values	and	beliefs	(Watson,	2006),	as	well	as	concerning	the	role	of	power	and	conflict	 in	planning	 in	the	South	(Watson,	2014).	This	 is	crucial	for	two	reasons.		Firstly,	 in	 the	planning	sphere	 in	 the	South	 it	 can	be	expected	 that	conflict	will	occur	within	the	planning	process	in	situations	that	involve	both	the	mutual	realities	of	the	 inhabitants	 of	 precarious	 settlements	 as	 well	 as	 the	 planning	 authorities.	 The	former	 need	 to	 build	 their	 living	with	 scarce	 resources,	 land	 invasions,	 etcetera.	 The	latter	 are	 engaged	 in	 heavily	 politicised	 activities,	 and	 are	 subjected	 to	 lobbying	 by	various	interest	groups	and	the	pressures	of	political	cycles.	In	rapidly	urbanising	areas,	conflicts	occur	on	a	daily	basis.	They	may	range	 from	soft,	discursive	struggles,	which	can	 be	 managed	 via	 consensus-oriented	 means,	 to	 violent	 confrontations	 in	 which	different	authorities	try	to	achieve	their	goals.	One	example	of	such	rapid	eruptions	of	violence	–	which	will	undoubtedly	increase	in	coming	years	due	to	climate	change	and	expanding	 urbanisation	 –	 are	 the	 land-related	 clashes	 in	 Juba,	 South	 Sudan.	 This	 is	 a	case	 of	 the	 complex	 reality	 in	 everyday	 struggles,	 where	 urban	 stakeholders	 assume	new	 roles,	 including	 public	 officials,	 traditional	 authorities	 and	 military	 actors	simultaneously	engage	in	grabbing	land	and	in	perpetuating	a	spiral	of	ethnic	violence	and	 inequality	 (McMichael,	 2014).	 In	 these	 types	 of	 contexts,	 the	 practice	 of	 urban	development	 exceeds	 the	 control	 of	 professional	 planners	 (Odendal,	 2012).	 In	 these	cases,	the	traditional	and	consensual	planning	instruments	that	are	largely	effective	in	the	 European	 context	 become	 ineffectual,	 the	 urban	 policies	 involved	 being	 more	strongly	determined	by	an	entire	set	of	factors	that	differ	from	the	familiar	procedures	informed	 by	 systematic	 and	 evidence-based	 data	 (Galuszka,	 2017).	 To	 this	 extent,	planners	in	the	South	are	faced	with	new	challenges	that	oblige	them	to	act	 in	a	more	politically	 conscious	 manner,	 prompting	 them	 to	 sometimes	 enter	 into	 politics	themselves	in	order	to	achieve	better	working	results	(Karki,	2017).	
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Analogously,	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 urban	 poor	 to	 engage	 in	 confrontational	 and	politicised	 spaces	 may	 be	 a	 clear	 manifestation	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	planning	 process,	 as	 opposed	 to	 participating	 in	 stakeholder	 structures	 that	 lack	 this	dynamic.	 In	 his	 notion	 of	 radical	 strategic	 planning	 as	 driven	 by	 the	 co-production	approach,	Albrechts	 (2012:	57)	notes	 that	 ‘as	 it	aims	 to	secure	political	 influence	 it	 is	certainly	confrontational	and	directed	at	a	change	by	means	of	specific	outputs	(plans,	policies,	 projects).’	 For	 this	 reason,	 in	 the	 South	 the	 co-production	 of	 governance	 is	rarely	 an	 outcome	 of	 public-sector-driven	 activities	 in	 those	 cases	 where	 a	 group	 is	nominated	 as	 the	 representative	 of	 the	 urban	 poor	 without	 being	 recognised	 as	 a	stakeholder	with	the	capacity	to	operate	in	the	conflict	spaces.	Instead,	such	recognition	needs	 to	 derive	 from	 independent	 mobilisation	 in	 civil	 society,	 involving	 a	 real	encroachment	into	the	governance	spectrum.	In	the	majority	of	cases,	this	includes	not	only	 formal	 or	 informal	 negotiations	 with	 the	 public	 sector,	 but	 also	 the	 ability	 to	navigate	 those	 spheres	which	 influence	 policy	making:	media,	 global	 opinion	makers,	donors	or	the	academic	sector.	The	key	factor	here	is	the	framing	of	an	input	with	which	the	urban	poor	can	contribute	 to	 the	co-productive	process	and	which	 translates	 into	power.	 This	 includes	 knowledge	 produced	 through	 community	 enumeration,	 money	generated	within	saving	schemes,	or	networking,	all	of	which	enable	the	urban	poor	to	counterbalance	 different	 planning	 paradigms	 using	 their	 own	 approaches	(Boonyabancha	 and	 Kerr,	 2015).vii	Indirectly,	 these	 activities	 also	 translate	 into	 the	building-up	of	social	capital,	which	is	one	of	the	key	pre-conditions	for	the	success	of	co-production	 (Voorberg,	et	al.,	 2015).	 The	 ability	 of	 the	urban	poor	 to	 directly	 enhance	their	own	financial	and	networking	bases	challenges	 the	power	relations	between	the	public	sector,	donors	and	communities	and	is	making	politicians	take	notice	of	them	as	an	 important	 voting	 force.	 These	 tangible	 and	 intangible	 resources	 allow	 them	 to	engage	in	complicated	negotiations	with	powerful	actors	who	operate	within	a	different	developmental	 logic	 and	 with	 their	 own	 agendas.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 resources	reverse	 the	dominant	 rationale	whereby	urban	dwellers	 learn	 from	professionals,	 the	former	instead	taking	on	the	role	of	educators	themselves	(Lipietz	and	Newton,	2015:	233).		 The	effective	conclusion	is	that	the	ability	of	groups	of	urban	poor	to	engage	in	conflict	situations	may	be	more	productive	than	their	operating	within	a	planning	arena	
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that	 involves	rigid	regulatory	decision-making	mechanisms,	even	 if	 these	mechanisms	to	some	extent	support	the	principle	of	protecting	weaker	stakeholders.		Secondly,	these	groups	require	the	capacity	to	generate	a	critical	numerical	mass	that	 can	 then	 engage	 in	more	 radical	 forms	 of	 conflict	 in	 order	 to	 push	 their	 agenda	forwards.	 This	 ability	 becomes	 especially	 relevant	 when	 the	 issue	 of	 distribution	 of	space	is	at	stake	–	a	question	that	cannot	be	tackled	without	the	factors	of	conflict	and	struggle	 (Castells,	 1983).	 These	 types	 of	 activities	 are	 encapsulated	within	 one	 of	 the	fiveviii 	interconnected	 domains	 of	 urban	 politics	 described	 by	 Pieterse	 (2008:	 95),	namely	that	of	direct	action,	in	that	the	‘street	conflicts,	clashes	and	destabilisation	that	spark	 off	 direct	 action	 are	 prerequisites	 for	 political	 agreements	 to	 address	 urban	inequalities.’ ix 	Although	 most	 successful	 national	 and	 international	 federations	 of	groups	 of	 urban	 poor,	 for	 instance	 the	 Slum	 Dwellers	 International	 or	 the	 ACHR,	achieved	their	status	largely	thanks	to	their	consensus	orientation	(Herrle,	et	al.,	2015),	their	 strategies	 in	 fact	 range	 from	 cooperation	 to	 contestation	 (Bradlow,	 2013).	Conflict-oriented	 measures	 such	 as	 protests	 can	 forge	 an	 equilibrium	 between	 the	urban	poor	on	the	one	side	and	the	power	of	public	stakeholders	and	the	private	sector	on	the	other,	as	illustrated	in	the	example	of	the	anti-eviction	campaign	in	South	Africa’s	Cape	Town	(see	Miraftab,	2009).	Overall,	while	the	protests	and	knowledge	or	resources	generated	by	the	urban	poor	 represent	 the	 ‘stick	 and	 carrot’,	 both	 factors	 are	 interlinked	 and	 tend,	 in	 the	context	 of	 the	 global	 South,	 to	 be	 more	 reflective	 of	 planning	 practices	 than	 the	principles	 and	 benefits	 of	 collaboration	 as	 understood	 in	 the	 participatory-planning	literature	set	in	the	context	of	the	global	North	(Siame,	2016).		
Contradiction	three:	process	vs.	output	
To	date	 there	 is	a	noticeable	 lack	of	empirical	data	showing	the	tangible	effects	of	co-production	(Voorberg,	et	al.,	2015),	especially	when	discussed	 in	 the	context	of	policy	and	urban	 governance.	What	 has	 been	documented	 is	 that	 co-production	 at	 a	 project	level	can	result	in	changes	of	governance,	ranging	from	small-scale	institutional	change	(Shand,	2015)	and	the	empowerment	of	specific	groups	(Banana,	et	al.,	2015)	to	a	more	substantial	 recognition	of	 the	urban	poor	(Mitlin,	2008).	However,	 it	 is	 less	clear	how	
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the	groups	of	urban	poor	that	have	attained	sufficient	power	to	frame	urban	governance	have	 exercised	 this	 power.	 Likewise,	 transformations	 in	 urban	 politics	 happen	 as	 a	result	 of	 multiply	 factors,	 rather	 than	 only	 a	 bottom	 up	 activism.	 These	 processes	typically	 occur	 as	 a	 result	 of	 socio-political	 mobilisations	 that	 advance	 the	 idea	 of	inclusive	citizenship,	as	in	the	case	of	the	Brazilian	City	Statute	from	2001	(Fernandes,	2007).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 social	 movements	 manage	 to	 leverage	 their	approaches	 also	 depends	 largely	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 state	 in	 which	 they	 operate	(Mitlin,	2006).		Indeed,	 much	 of	 the	 work	 of	 the	 urban-poor	 movements	 in	 the	 South	concentrates	on	two	interlinked	objectives:	the	recognition	of	basic	rights	(such	as	the	right	 to	 live	 in	a	specific	 location	or	 to	build	one’s	own	house)	and	a	redistribution	of	wealth.	Project-level	co-production	clearly	addresses	the	first	of	the	aspirations	through	the	construction	of	adequate	shelter,	the	provision	of	 infrastructure	or	the	securing	of	land	for	development,	and	through	helping	achieve	the	recognition	of	the	urban	poor	as	an	active	counterpart	in	planning	and	service	delivery.	In	this	context,	by	definition	co-production	 is	 intended	 to	 address	 the	 shortcomings	of	 the	 classic	Weberian	model	 of	service	delivery	(Mitlin,	2008).		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 institutionalised	 participatory	 spaces	 are	 seen	 by	 some	scholars	 as	 a	mechanism	 that	 increasingly	 puts	 the	 onus	 for	 service	 provision	 on	 the	private	 sector,	 citizens	 and	 civil	 society,	 correspondingly	 negating	 it	 as	 a	 state	 duty.	Rather	 than	 being	 isolated	 cases,	 this	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 part	 of	 a	 general	 trend	originating	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 when	 in	 some	 countries,	 as	 Pieterse	 comments	(2008:	64),	‘neoliberalism	flourished	under	the	drive	for	state	withdrawal	from	services	delivery	to	counteract	the	perceived	inefficiency	and	corruption	of	these	machineries.’		Simultaneously,	thanks	to	the	role	of	co-production,	civil	society	is	able	to	affect	governance	and,	arguably,	contribute	to	the	realisation	of	the	second	objective,	namely	the	 calls	 for	 a	 redistribution	 of	 wealth	 (Mitlin,	 2006).x	Although	 this	 can	 potentially	involve	any	number	of	different	solutions,	including	value-capture	mechanisms	in	land	ownership	or	securing	a	basic	income	for	unprivileged	segments	of	society,	in	the	urban	realm	 in	 the	 South	 it	 is	 very	often	 linked	 to	 a	 reintroduction	of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 service	provider.	Paradoxically,	 this	entails	a	risk	of	reversing	project-level	co-production	and	losing	the	already	volatile	control	over	some	aspects	of	the	development	process.	
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In	 the	 recent	 years	 there	 has	 been	 a	 visible	 trend	 of	 diminishing	 self-help	approaches	 in	 favour	 of	 reverting	 to	 large-scale	 state-controlled	 or	 private-sector	housing	initiatives	and	subsidies	programmes,	such	as	Housing	for	All	by	2020	in	India,	Minha	Casa	Minha	Vida	in	Brazil	or	the	Reconstruction	and	Development	Programme	in	South	 Africa,	 many	 of	 which	 are	 characterised	 by	 peripheral	 locations,	 and	which	 in	effect	fail	to	substantially	benefit	the	urban	poor	(Huchzermeyer	and	Misselwitz,	2016).	Although	 these	 types	of	projects	are	not	always	a	result	of	civil	 society	pressures,	 the	pitfall	 of	 deliberative	 processes	 becoming	manipulated	 appears	 to	 be	 extremely	 high	when	promises	of	 a	 redistribution	of	wealth	 to	 the	 advantage	of	 the	urban	poor	 is	 at	stake.	 The	case	of	the	South	African	housing	sector	over	the	last	25	years	illustrates	the	third	contradiction	discussed	in	this	article.	In	what	was	a	unique	development	in	Africa	in	 the	 1990s,	 following	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 apartheid	 regime	 a	 huge	 Reconstruction	 and	Development	 housing	 programme	 provided	 one	 million	 ‘free’	 housing	 opportunities	during	 the	 first	 six	 years	 of	 operations.	 It	was	preceded	by	 a	 supposedly	deliberative	process	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 participatory	 space	 –	 the	 National	 Housing	 Forum	 –	 that	brought	 together	 representatives	 of	 civil	 society,	 the	 state	 and	developers.	 In	 spite	 of	the	 initial	 civil	 society	 interest	 in	 co-productive	 housing	 approaches,	 pressures	 from	developers	resulted	in	the	authorisation	of	the	delivery	of	uniform	neighbourhoods	by	the	 state	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 (Huchzermeyer,	 2003).	 Even	 though	 the	 programme	perpetuated	 the	urban	 socio-spatial	 divisions	of	 the	 apartheid	 era,	 its	 product	 (single	storey	 houses	 with	 a	 small	 ‘garden’)	 outlasted	 the	 programme	 and	 continued	 to	 be	viewed	as	an	ideal	housing	model	(Galuszka,	2017)	and	a	citizen’s	right.	Consequently,	the	process	of	shifting	the	housing	approach	in	South	Africa	to	more	co-productive	and	incremental	formats	remained	contested	for	years,	confronting	the	advocates	of	change	with	numerous	obstacles.	Although	many	non-governmental	organisations	and	citizens	groups	 have	 advocated	 a	 more	 co-productive	 approach,xi 	service-delivery	 protests	agitating	for	the	receipt	of	conventional	housing	or	other	services	are	still	very	common	(Pithouse,	2010).	 In	 this	case,	 therefore,	co-productive	approaches	are	positioned	–	at	least	perceptually	–	in	opposition	to	the	principle	of	wealth	redistribution.	This	contradiction	is	likewise	potentially	visible	in	contexts	where	co-production	is	more	firmly	embedded	in	the	local	urban-development	paradigm	than	in	the	case	of	South	Africa.	One	intriguing	achievement	illustrating	the	process	by	which	civil	society	
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has	succeeded	in	securing	funding	for	the	housing	strategy	of	their	choice,	and	to	a	large	degree	 one	 that	 is	 driven	 by	 the	 co-production	 of	 governance,	 comes	 from	 the	Philippines.	 It	 involves	 the	 Urban	 Poor	 Alliance	 (UP-ALL),	 who	 involved	 themselves	with	long-term	groundwork	by	local	organisations,	building	up	a	relationship	with	the	government	 both	 outside	 of	 institutionalised	 bodies,	 as	 well	 as	 within	 existing	programmes.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 lengthy	 effort,	 elements	 of	 the	 ‘People’s	 Plans’	 were	incorporated	 by	 President	 Benigno	 ‘Noynoy’	 Aquino’s	 administration	 into	 the	 Oplan	LIKAS	programme	which	commenced	in	 in	2011	(Karaos	and	Porio,	2015).	One	of	the	modalities	of	the	programme	responds	to	the	agenda	of	the	urban	poor	by	supporting	in-city	 development	 and	 high-density,	 medium-rise	 housing,	 simultaneously	 enabling	communities	 to	 retain	a	 reasonable	degree	of	 control	over	 the	processes	 involved.	 Its	key	 component,	 the	 High	 Density	 Housing	 Programme,	 was	 supported	 by	 the	administration	with	 circa	 10	 billion	 Philippine	 Pesos.	 However,	 the	 new	multi-storey	housing	 format	 has	 required	 a	 sub-contracting	 of	 construction	 companies,	which	 has	increased	 the	 project	 costs	 (Ballesteros,	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 and	 to	 some	 degree	 negates	community	 control	 over	 the	 construction	 process.	 Although	 the	 community	organisations	 remain	 the	 supervisors	 of	 the	 process,	 they	 are	 no	 longer	 the	 main	constructors.xii 	As	 such,	 the	 example	 shows	 that	 although	 the	 urban	 poor	 in	 the	Philippines	 have	 used	 co-production	 to	 engage	 in	 service	 delivery,	 in	 terms	 of	governance	involvement	they	have	also	opted	for	different	housing	types	and	upgrading	solutions	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	 balance	 between	 the	 variety	 of	 priorities	 present	 in	informal	 settlements.	 The	 sustainability	 of	 this	 approach	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 the	programme	 still	 require	 evaluation,	 including	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 housing	 process.	Nevertheless,	the	ability	of	the	urban	poor	in	this	case	to	secure	additional	funding	for	their	 preferred	 housing	 strategy	 illustrates	 their	 ability	 to	 successfully	 engage	 with	governance	at	the	programme’s	formulation	stage.	This	is	particularly	relevant	because	of	 the	 reported	 impossibility	 of	 achieving	 a	 similar	 goal	 over	 the	 preceding	 decades	(Hutchison,	2007).		It	can	be	argued	that	co-productive	governance	provides	a	 flexibility	to	change,	adapt	 and	 update	 proposed	 solutions.	 In	 contrast	 to	 classic	 participatory	 spaces,	 this	can	mean	that	civil	society	actors	are	not	merely	consulted	regarding	specific	decisions,	but	 are	 active	 implementers	of	 them	 too.	 In	 line	with	 the	 arguments	discussed	above	regarding	 the	 first	 contradiction	 (institutionalisation	 vs.	 flexibility),	 this	 implies	 an	
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ability	 to	 act	 outside	 of	 existing	 regulations,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 continuous	 involvement	 in	governing	 the	 delivery	 of	 specific	 strategies	 and	 playing	 a	 monitoring	 role.	 In	 this	respect,	one	strong	indicator	of	the	success	of	this	model	would	be	that	institutionalised	and	 non-institutionalised	 governance	 relations	 outlive	 the	 span	 of	 a	 specific	 political	leadership	and	 its	clientelistic	aspects,	which	 is	often	the	motor	behind	these	types	of	relations	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 South	 (Anciano,	 2017).	 In	 other	words,	 successful	 and	ideal	models	of	co-produced	urban	governance	should	attain	a	balance	between	the	two	goals	 of	 the	 urban	 poor	 in	 the	 South	 –	 the	 securing	 of	 greater	 control	 over	 the	development	 process	 and	 the	 securing	 of	 access	 to	 resources	 –	 regardless	 of	 the	changes	in	the	political	leadership	in	a	country.	
Evaluating	 co-productive	 governance	 bodies	 –	 focus	 area	 and	 methodological	
considerations		
In	line	with	the	contradictions	discussed	above,	the	concept	of	the	co-production	of	 urban	 governance	 calls	 for	 a	 set	 of	 refined	methodological	 considerations	 that	 can	assist	in	understanding	the	characteristics	of	co-productive	bodies	operating	on	a	policy	level	 in	 the	South.	This	 requires	moving	beyond	 the	analytical	 categories	used	 for	 the	evaluation	of	participatory	governance	schemes.	While	these	undoubtedly	provide	a	set	of	valuable	insights	into	the	participation	formats	or	the	levels	of	authority	of	different	stakeholders	(Fung,	2006;	Cornwall,	2008),	the	innovative	aspect	of	the	co-production	of	 governance,	 as	 laid	 out	 previously,	 lies	 beyond	 the	 set-up	 of	 an	 institution,	 its	governing	 rules	 and	 its	 immediate	 outcomes.	 Instead,	 the	 argument	 is	 that	 urban	movements	need	to	secure	their	political	 influence	outside	of	the	existing	institutional	formats.	 Consequently,	 any	 evaluation	 of	 co-productive	 governance	 arrangements	requires	 an	 additional	 analysis	 of	 the	 process	 of	 its	 formation	 and	 the	 external	strategies	 that	 affect	 its	 functioning.	 While	 this	 broadly	 fits	 both	 the	 dimension	 of	governance	 cultures	 and	 the	 focus	 on	 interaction	 relations	 discussed	 within	 the	collaborative	planning	approach	(Healey,	1997),	its	differences	from	the	co-productive	processes	located	beyond	the	Western	context	(Watson,	2014;	Healey,	2003)	call	for	an	augmentation	 of	 the	 analytical	 framework	 to	 include	 considerations	 relevant	 in	 the	South.		
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Following	 from	 the	 first	 contradiction	 (institutionalisation	 vs.	 flexibility),	 these	potential	 areas	 of	 interest	 concern	 how	 issues	 of	 flexibility	 are	 treated.	 This	 includes	inquiring	 if	and	how	the	counterparts	amongst	 the	urban	poor	 in	a	process	engage	 in	setting	 up	 specific	 governance	 arrangements.	 Likewise,	 it	 requires	 reflection	 on	 how	flexible	the	frameworks	of	co-productive	processes	are,	and	to	what	degree	they	enable	the	 integration	of	 those	approaches	 formulated	by	 the	urban	poor	 that	are	positioned	extraneously	 to	 the	 legal	machinery	 in	a	 specific	 context.	Lastly,	 it	 is	 relevant	 in	what	way	 collective	 action	 is	 treated,	 and	 whether	 the	 dominant	 factors	 favour	 either	 a	tendency	for	the	 individualisation	of	decision-making	through	voting	mechanisms	and	the	offering	of	plebiscitary	choices	on	the	one	hand,	or	for	that	matter	the	possibility	of	deep	negotiations	on	the	other.		The	 discussion	 of	 the	 second	 contradiction	 (cooperation	 vs.	 conflict)	 suggests	that	 research	should	also	 focus	on	what	kind	of	 tangible	and	 intangible	 resources	are	added	 by	 the	 counterparts	 to	 the	 process,	 and	 how	 these	 resources	 affect	 power	relations	 and	 decisions	 within	 a	 specific	 context.	 This	 should	 also	 include	 an	examination	of	how	the	counterparts	to	the	process	use	conflict-oriented	means	located	outside	 of	 a	 specific	 governance	 arrangement	 or	 institution,	 and	 how	 these	 actions	affect	 the	 work	 of	 these	 counterparts.	 These	means	may	 range	 from	 protests	 by	 the	urban	 poor	 and	 the	 use	 of	 public-sector	 law	 enforcement	 to	 private-sector	 pressure	mechanisms,	 often	manifested	 in	 relation	 to	 large-scale	 projects	 driven	by	 real-estate	interests.		Lastly,	 when	 evaluating	 the	 impacts	 of	 co-production	 at	 a	 policy	 level,	 it	 is	important	to	analyse	the	ways	in	which	it	contributes	to	the	realisation	of	the	objectives	of	 the	 urban	 poor,	 in	 other	 words	 control	 over	 the	 development	 process	 and	 the	redistribution	of	resources.	Based	on	the	examples	discussed,	these	two	objectives	often	become	 mutually	 exclusive	 and	 the	 latter	 can	 become	 an	 instrument	 of	 political	patronage	 and	 the	 co-optation	 of	 independent	 movements.	 In	 true	 co-productive	arrangements	 the	 urban	 poor	 should	 arguably	 be	 able	 to	 navigate	 between	 these	objectives,	 and	 if	 they	 opt	 for	 one	 over	 the	 other	 should	 have	 the	 ability	 to	monitor,	review	and	update	their	decisions	in	negotiation	with	their	public-sector	partners	
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Conclusions	
Based	 on	 the	 increased	 use	 of	 the	 term	 co-production	 in	multiple	 contexts,	 as	well	 as	 the	 review	 of	 three	 contradictions	 visible	 in	 the	 current	 discussion	 on	 the	phenomenon,	 the	argument	 is	 that	 the	concept	of	co-production	 in	 the	South	requires	sharper	 theoretical	 frames,	particularly	by	delinking	 it	 from	some	of	 the	assumptions	based	on	case	studies	originating	from	the	North.		This	 in	 turn	 links	 to	 the	outlined	overlap	between	 the	notion	of	 co-governance	and	 classic	 participatory	 governance	 schemes	 conceived	 as	 invited	 spaces	 of	participation	and	facilitated	by	global	institutions	positioned	in	the	power	centres.	What	emerges	is	that	the	term	co-production	of	governance,	which	encompasses	activities	by	civil-society	 actors	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 formalised	 institutions,	 may	 be	 more	relevant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 South	 than	 that	 of	 co-governance.	 The	 inclusion	 of	activities	 beyond	 the	 purview	 of	 formal	 bodies	 is	 crucial,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	assumption	is	that	institutional	change	is	highly	unlikely	to	take	place	without	an	active	civil-society	sector	that	is	able	to	build	up	its	own	knowledge	and	resource	bases,	which	includes	 a	 capacity	 to	 operate	 in	 conflict	 spaces.	 As	 such,	 maintaining	 a	 degree	 of	independence	from	a	specific	legal	frameworks	or	institutional	settings	is	considered	to	be	advantageous	to	civil-society	actors	and	plays	a	supportive	role	in	steering	collective	actions,	as	reinforced	through	networking	activities.	The	latter	is	associated	with	a	need	for	 the	 urban	 poor	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 urban	 governance	 bodies	 and	institutions,	 rather	 than	 in	 formats	 set	 up	 exclusively	 by	 the	 state.	 The	 capacity	 to	operate	 in	the	 informal	sphere	 is	also	considered	to	be	another	key	component	 in	the	co-production	of	governance,	rooted	in	the	flexibility	and	innovations	generated	on	the	interface	 between	 different	 planning	 systems.	 Additionally,	 in	 keeping	 with	contradiction	three	(process	vs.	output),	a	true	engagement	of	the	urban	poor	in	the	co-production	of	governance	would	mean	 that	retaining	reasonable	control	over	project-level	co-production	does	not	become	mutually	exclusive	with	the	other	objective	of	the	urban	poor,	namely	a	redistribution	of	resources.	Lastly,	 the	specifics	of	 the	co-production	of	governance	 in	the	South	elaborated	above	require	the	development	of	analytical	frameworks	that	enable	an	exploration	of	the	nature	of	the	phenomena	from	a	local	perspective,	which	in	turn	relates	to	a	broad	
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set	 of	 activities	 by	 the	 urban	 poor	 that	 shape	 the	 process	 outside	 of	 the	 established	regulatory	frameworks.	
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